University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 1

Article 6

1994

A Typology of Transjudicial Communication
Anne-Marie Slaughter

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, International Law
Commons, and the Judges Commons
Recommended Citation
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 99 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

A TYPOLOGY OF TRANSJUDICIAL COMMUNICATION
Anne-Marie Slaughter*
Courts are talking to one another all over the world. Mary
Ann Glendon describes a "brisk international traffic in ideas
about rights," conducted by judges.1 "In Europe generally," she
adds, "and in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, national
law is increasingly caught up in a process of cross-fertilization
among legal systems."2 Similarly, Anthony Lester writes:
When life or liberty is at stake, the landmark judgments of
the Supreme Court of the United States, giving fresh meaning to the principles of the Bill of Rights, are studied with
as much attention in New Delhi or Strasbourg as they are
in Washington, D.C., or the State of Washington, or Springfield, Illinois.'
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe cites decisions of the European Court of Human Rights to support its determination that
corporal punishment of an adult constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment4 and that corporal punishment of a juvenile is
unconstitutional. 5 The European Court of Justice and the Euro* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Formerly Anne-Marie Burley. I am
grateful to David Zaring for excellent research assistance. Many thanks also to the
University of Richmond Law School and the Allen family for a delightful week as the
Allen Chair Professor and the opportunity to contribute to this symposium.
1. MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK
COURSE 158 (1991).
2. Id.

THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL Dis-

3. Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 537, 541 (1988).

4. State v. Ncube, 2 S. AFR. L. REP. 702 (1988) (Zimb.) (citing Tyrer v. United
Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)).
5. Judgment of June 19, 1989 (Juvenile v. State), Judgment No. 64/89 (Zimb.)
(citing Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) and Campbell v.
United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982)); see Keith Highet et al., Zimbabwe-Human Rights-Inhuman or Degrading Punishment-Incorporationof International Standards in Domestic Law: Juvenile v. State. Judgement No. 64/89, Crim.
App. No. 156/88. Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, March 22 and June 19, 1989, 84 AM1.
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pean Court of Human Rights cite one another's decisions; the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights looks frequently to the
European Court's caselaw. Approximately 60% of the citations
of Quebec courts are to sources other than Quebec decisions,
including French authors and decisions, common law decisions
and authors from a range of countries.6
Within both the European Union and the Council of Europe,
courts are entering into forms of judicial dialogue. The most
advanced form of such interaction is the recent call by the
German Constitutional Court for a "relationship of co-operation"
with the European Court of Justice, in which both entities
would form a kind of partnership in delimiting the boundaries
of the competences of the European Community.7 More generally, many observers of the European Court of Justice ('ECJ"),
including a number of judges, attribute its success to its establishment of a dialogue with the lower national courts, whereby
these courts refer cases raising European law issues to the ECJ
and then use its analysis of these issues to guide their disposition of the case.8 At the same time, national courts are also
talking to one another. Joseph Weiler argues that national
supreme courts in Europe took account of one another's position
on the acceptance of European Community ("EC") law in deciding whether, and how far, to push or commit their own governments.9 Finally, moving beyond the European Union to the
Council of Europe, Polakiewicz and Jacob-Foltzer observe, in a
major review of the impact of the European Human Rights
Convention in domestic law, that "even in the absence of a

J. INT'L L. 768 (1990).
6. H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 294 (1987). Common law courts in Canada are similarly eclectic. Id. at 295-97.
7. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, (Brunner v. The European Union Treaty),
Bundesverfassungsgericht (2. Senat) [Federal Constitutional Court, 2d Chamber],
[1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (F.R.G.). See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,
2426 (1991); G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 595, 609-11 (1989); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making
of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1981); Ulrich Everling, The
Court of Justice as a Decision-making Authority, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1294, 1302-04
(1984); T. Koopmans, The Role of Law in the Next Stage of European Integration, 35
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 925, 927 (1986).
9. J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its
Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 521-23 (1994).
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formal procedure that regulates the relationship between the
European Court and national jurisdictions ... we are witnessing the beginning of a dialogue between these different jurisdictions."0
Are all these examples part of a single phenomenon? They
are all forms of transjudicial communication: communication
among courts-whether national or supranational-across borders. They vary enormously, however, in form, function, and
degree of reciprocal engagement. The dialogue between the
German Constitutional Court and the ECJ suggests the possibility of a relationship of collective deliberation on common
legal problems; the citation of a U.S. Supreme Court decision in
India, or a European Court of Human Rights decision in Zimbabwe, reflects a less interactive process of intellectual cross-fertilization. Alternatively, taking account of the position of fellow
national courts in accepting the obligations of a common treaty
may simply be an instance of taking advantage of a quick
source of information about the degree of reciprocal acceptance
of these obligations, without any overlay of special "judicial"
communication.
Behind these differences also lie important structural differences. European national courts interact with the ECJ within
the framework of a treaty providing for a referral mechanism
and specifying that rulings of the ECJ are binding on the member states of the European Community." Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Optional Protocol to
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights provide for mechanisms of individual petition whereby individual
citizens can, in effect, challenge the decisions of their national
courts before a supranational tribunal. 2 A practice of cross10. Jorg Polakiewicz & Valdrie Jacob-Foltzer, The European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: The Impact of the Strasbourg Case-Law in States Where
Direct Effect is Given to the Convention (pt. 2), 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 125, 142 (1991).
11. Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome provides that "the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the community and the ECB, the interpretation of
the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council" may be referred to the
ECJ by any court of a member-state, and must be referred by a "court or tribunal
from whose decision not appeal lies under municipal law." Article 171 requires member states to "take the measures required for the implementation of the judgment" of
the European Court of Justice. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
12. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
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citation to foreign courts, on the other hand, takes place outside
any formal treaty context. If structured at all, it is more likely
to flow from a common substantive mission, such as the protection of human rights, at a national, regional, or international
level.
These differences notwithstanding, I suggest that there are
important commonalities that do in fact link all the above examples as part of a common phenomenon. Before exploring
these commonalities, however, it is useful to develop a pure
phenomenological approach a bit further, identifying and analyzing examples of the phenomenon under observation. I thus
begin by developing a typology of transjudicial communication
according to both form and function. Part II will then investigate the underlying preconditions or attributes that unify a
wide range of discrete examples. In particular, I contend that
all these instances display, indeed require, certain unifying features: an emphasis on judicial autonomy; a reliance on persuasive authority; and a sense of common judicial identity and
enterprise. These common features do not dissolve relevant
differences with regard to different types of transjudicial
communication, but at least help to locate these differences
along a single spectrum. Finally, Part IV speculates on the
deeper causes and consequences of the phenomenon of
transjudicial communication.
A final caveat. This article is intended as an exploratory
essay, and thus relies on a relatively small universe of examples. Even an anecdotal survey suggests, however, that many
more instances of transjudicial communication could be identified. It is my hope that labeling and analyzing this phenomenon, even on an exploratory basis, will stimulate further research and discussion.

Rights, G.A. Res 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 2, at 59, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368, 369; European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 48, 312 U.N.T.S.
221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. The European Court of
Human Rights ("ECHR") can only hear a case after all domestic remedies have been
exhausted through the domestic legal system. See European Convention on Human
Rights art. 26. Thus, if a complainant chooses to pursue her complaint in Strasbourg,
and her complaint is deemed admissible, the ECHR effectively sits in judgment on
the action taken by the domestic courts of the complainant's state.
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I. FORMS OF TRANsJuDICIAL COMMUNICATION
The geometry of transjudicial communication varies according
to the national or supranational status of the courts talking to
one another. I identify three distinct forms of such communication: horizontal, vertical, and mixed vertical-horizontal. A related difference flows from the relative status of courts in a national or supranational hierarchy. National supreme courts, for
instance, may be more likely to take account of each other's
judgments than of the judgments of lower foreign courts.
A. Horizontal Communication
Horizontal communication takes place between courts of the
same status, whether national or supranational, across national
or regional borders. The best developed form of such communication is among the constitutional courts of Europe, where judges actually meet in a triennial conference. 3 My focus here is
not on actual face-to-face conversation among judges, however,
but rather on the awareness of each other's decisions that such
meetings bring about or reinforce. These courts are not bound
to follow or even take account of one another's jurisprudence by
any formal relationship. Nor are they necessarily likely to acknowledge the fruits of such communication by actual citation
to each other's decisions.'4 Nevertheless, informal conversations
with European supreme court judges and their clerks suggest
that increasing cross-fertilization is indeed taking place.
Beyond Europe, Anthony Lester, Mary Ann Glendon, and
Louis Henkin have all chronicled the flow of ideas from the
U.S. Supreme Court to supreme courts all over the world. 5

13. The Conference of European Constitutional Courts periodically publishes its
proceedings. See, e.g., VI CONFERENCIA DE TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES EUROPEOS,
TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES Europeos y Autonomas Territoriales (1985). See also
GLENDON, supra note 1, at 158 n.38.
14. But see Judgment of June 8, 1984 (soc. Granital v. Ministero di Finanze),
Corte Constituzionale [Constitutional Court], I Foro It. 2062 (Italy) (citing evidence of
application of Community regulations in other member states, particularly in the
German federal system).
15. See Glendon, supra note 1; Lester, supra note 3; Louis Henkin,
Constitutionalism and Human Rights, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTs 383, 392-95
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This communication is as yet markedly one-sided, as the U.S.
Supreme Court has not seen fit to reciprocate in kind. Even in
its present form, however, it bears the same hallmark of courts
of equal status in their respective national legal systems taking
account of one another's opinions.
National courts below the level of supreme courts may also
engage in at least tacit communication with one another. In
addition to cross-citation, recognition of foreign judgments constitutes a form of horizontal transjudicial communication. Such
acts are usually considered instances of static deference to a
tribunal of original jurisdiction; nevertheless, in some instances
the communication between the two courts concerned is direct
and active. In Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Systems
Inc.,16 a case involving recognition of a decree of a Dutch
bankruptcy court, the Third Circuit directed the lower court to
seek assurances of reciprocity from the Dutch court before rendering a final judgment. 7 Several other instances of prolonged
litigation involving British and U.S. parties have resulted in
fairly direct communication between U.S. and British courts in
which each side acknowledged direct conflict with the other,"
and in one case a U.S. court modified its judgment following
non-recognition of a particular portion by a British court. 9

(Louis Henkin, ed. 1990). The Canadian Supreme Court, for example, observed in an
early decision under the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that "it is of
more than passing interest to those concerned with these new developments in Canada to study the experience of the United States courts." Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, 1 S.C.R. 357, 367 (Can. 1984) The court's concern is not new. United States cases constituted approximately twenty-five percent of cases cited by the
earliest manifestation of the current court. J.M. MacIntyre, The Use of American
Cases in Canadian Courts, 1966 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 478, 486. The Court continues to cite extensively to United States cases. Glenn, supra note 6, at 296.
16. 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987).
17. Id. at 1273.
18. For example, in Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the
D.C. Circuit noted a British appellate court's conclusion that the Laker case had been
handled by an American federal district court in a manner "wholly untriable" that
could result in a "total denial of justice" to the British airline involved. Id. at 920
(citing British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, [1983] 3 W.L.R. 544, 573, 591 (Eng.
C.A.).
19. An early example of Anglo-American judicial dialogue appeared in the Nylon
Patent litigation in the mid-1950s. The United States brought a suit against DuPont
and Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), a British company, for concluding a global
market-sharing agreement for nylon sales. A U.S. court ordered ICI to license its U.S.
nylon patents on a reasonable royalty basis and tried to fashion a similar remedy
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Such communication may also arise during the process of determining where a suit should be heard. The consideration of
motions for the granting of an anti-suit injunction to block
litigation in a foreign court and of dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds to direct litigation to a foreign court both may
involve U.S. courts in a form of communication with the foreign
court.20 To the extent that the foreign court is engaged in a
reciprocal determination, both courts can be seen as cooperating
in an effort to direct the litigation to the natural or most appropriate forum.
Supranational courts also engage in horizontal communication, as evidenced both by direct citation and tacit emulation.
Professor Merrills, highlighting the worldwide impact of Europe-

applicable to the United Kingdom by ordering ICI not to challenge violations of its
British patents by nylon importers into Britain. U.S. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd.,
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In a subsequent suit against ICI by one of its
subsidiaries for specific performance on a contract for exclusive patents, a British
court rejected the portion of the American decree that attempted to affect rights created under British law, arguing that the U.S. court would not regard this action "as
in any way inappropriate." British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
[1955] Ch. 37, 53 (Ch. 1955). For excerpts from this judicial dialogue, see 1 ABRAM
CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 397-402 (1968).
20. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Laker litigation began in the D.C. District Court as an antitrust action against a number of
transatlantic airlines. The defendants obtained a preliminary injunction in the British
High Court of Justice forbidding Laker from prosecuting its American antitrust action. The British Court of Appeal subsequently issued a permanent injunction requiring Laker to dismiss its suit against the British defendants, and characterized the
American action as "wholly untriable." British Airways Board v. Laker Airways,
[19831 3 W.L.R. 545, 573 (CA. 1983). Laker then obtained an American injunction
preventing the remaining defendants from duplicating the request for an English
injunction. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the propriety of Laker's move. The court recognized that in some cases "it may even be necessary to issue a counterinjunction to
thwart another state's attempt to assert exclusive jurisdiction over a matter legitimately subject to concurrent jurisdiction." 731 F.2d at 934. For an account of the
back-and-forth court decisions in the Laker litigation, see Daryl A. Libow, Note, The
Laker Antitrust Litigation: The Jurisdictional 'Rule of Reason' Applied to Transnational Injunctive Relief, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 655-661 (1986). See also Bano Bi v.
Union Carbide, 984 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1993). The Second Circuit, in interpreting the
effect it would give an Indian statute settling litigation in the aftermath of the
Bhopal disaster, looked to the conclusions of the Indian Supreme Court on that statute for guidance. Id. at 585. See also Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indem.
Co., 531 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1982) (enjoining insurer from pursuing suit in an
equally convenient foreign forum to avoid unnecessary duplication and referring to
suit filed by plaintiff in the High Court of Justice in London); Harrison v. Wyeth
Lab., 510 F.Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (dismissing products liability suit by British
plaintiffs on forum non conveniens grounds).
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an human rights jurisprudence in a recent study of the ECHR,
notes that "the interpretations and, more crucially, the general
approach of the [ECHR] can be important" in construing other
human rights treaties.2' He documents numerous instances in
which the reasoning and interpretative methodologies first developed in Europe were later accepted by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights
Committee.2 There is one crucial difference, however, in the
manner in which European precedents were used by these two
human rights institutions. Whereas the Inter-American Court
expressly cited to European Court and Commission case law as
persuasive authority, the Human Rights Committee's echoing of
a previously developed European approach could only be discovered by carefully comparing the relevant decisions. Even where
"the Committee's reasoning [was] virtually identical" to that of
the European Court, the Committee made no express reference
to the court's judgments.'
B. Vertical Communication
Vertical communication takes place between national and
supranational courts. The most developed form of such communication has emerged within the framework of a treaty establishing a supranational tribunal with a specialized jurisdiction
that overlaps the jurisdiction of national courts. The Treaty of
Rome granted the ECJ jurisdiction over particular categories of
suits between member states of the European Community and
between the European Commission and member states.2 As
21. J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (2d ed. 1993)
22. Id. at 19.
23. A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 62-63

(3d ed. 1989) (comparing Hartikainen v. Findland, No. 9/40, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, Annex XV at 147 (1981) and Danish Sex Education Case (Kjeldsen v.
Denmark), 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976)). Other areas in which the Committee's
case law parallels that of the European human rights tribunals include the standard
for measuring invidious discrimination, the adoption of a margin of discretion when
reviewing the actions of states parties, see ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra at 64, and
the extension of the right of privacy to homosexual conduct between consenting adults
in private. Compare Toonen v. Australia, No. 488/1992, Human Rights Committee
50th Sess., slip op. (1994) with Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
24. Treaty of Rome, supra note 11, arts. 169, 170, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75.
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discussed above, it also empowered the ECJ to resolve questions of European law referred to it by national courts. 5 The
ECHR, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and
the United Nations Human Rights Committee are all empowered to adjudicate disputes arising in the first instance within
the jurisdiction of a national court." The structural framework
within which these tribunals operate thus establishes a relationship between them and the national courts of the states
whose obligations they monitor and enforce. Further, the practical effectiveness of these tribunals will depend in large part on
the extent to which national courts take account of their decisions.
The following examples of vertical dialogue are drawn from
the experience of the ECJ; although some elements of its relationship with national courts may be unique to the development
of the legal system of the European Community, others are
likely to prove more generalizable. The functions of this vertical
dialogue and the motives behind it will be discussed below; the
purpose here is primarily to provide illustrations of this phenomenon.
Most of the landmark decisions of the ECJ address themselves quite explicitly both to national courts and to the individual litigants (and their lawyers) who form the constituency of
those national courts. They are opinions designed to persuade,
to educate, even to cajole. The landmark decision of Van Gend
& Loos,27 in which the ECJ first announced the doctrine that
certain provisions of the Treaty of Rome could be directly invoked by individual litigants before national courts even in the
m
absence of implementing legislation by national governments,"
25. Id. art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. at 76-77. See supra text accompanying note 12.
26. As noted above, the ECHR can only hear cases after all domestic remedies
have been exhausted. See supra text accompanying note 12. Article 46 of the American Convention on Human Rights also requires exhaustion of domestic remedies before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights may admit a petition for examination. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art. 46, 1144
U.N.T.S. 144, 155. Under Article 61 of that convention, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights may only exercise jurisdiction over cases referred to it by states after
it is satisfied that the admission procedures applicable to the Commission have been
satisfied. Id. art. 61, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159.
27. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend &
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
28. Id. at 10-12.
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set the tone and the terms of this dialogue. The court, faced
with one of its first references from a national court (the Dutch
Tariefcommissie), was anxious to encourage additional references while simultaneously establishing its own authority within
the sphere of Community law. It thus adopted a strategy of
manifest deference to national courts acting within their proper
sphere of jurisdiction, combined with an appeal to these courts
to use Community law in exercising their primary function of
protecting individual rights. For instance, in response to a contention by the Belgian government that no ruling by the ECJ
could have any bearing on further proceedings in the
Tariefcommissie, the ECJ emphasized that it was up to the
national court to decide whether to seek assistance on questions
of Community law, and that the "considerations which may
have led a national court or tribunal to its choice of questions
as well as the relevance which it attributes to such questions in
the context of a case before it are excluded from review by the
Court of Justice."2 9 After holding that Article 12 of the Treaty
of Rome was directly applicable before the national courts, the
court concluded that the actual application of that article on
the specific facts of the case presented was a matter for the
Tariefcommissie to resolve, contenting itself with a final declaration that "Article 12 ... produces direct effects and creates
individual rights which national courts must protect."30
The ECJ repeated these formulae in case after case. It next
confronted the task of encouraging direct references from lower
national courts in the face of opposition from their own supreme courts. The court responded by again emphasizing, court
to court, the duties of the national courts to protect individual
rights. In Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v.
Simmenthal,31 a lower Italian court asked the ECJ to resolve a
conflict between a provision of Community law and an apparently conflicting provision of the Italian Constitution, notwithstanding a decision by the Italian Constitutional Court that
such conflicts should be referred to the Constitutional Court
itself.32 The ECJ held that the provisions of Community law

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 15.
Case 106/77, 1978 E.C.R. 629.
Id. at 629.
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a direct source of rights and duties for all those
are ..
affected thereby, whether Member States or individuals,
who are parties to legal relationships under Community
law. This consequence also concerns any national court
whose task it is as an organ of a Member State to protect,
in a case within its jurisdiction, the rights conferred upon
individuals by Community law.33
It followed that any provision of national law that threatened
to impede the ability of national courts to enforce Community
law was itself a violation of Community law, and should thus
be disregarded by the national court.'
Here the ECJ depicted itself in partnership with the national
courts, collaborating together to enforce Community law. National courts responded in kind, increasing the number of references under Article 177 from 9 in 1968 to 119 in 1978." 5 Moreover, some national courts became active rhetorical participants
in this emerging dialogue, challenging the ECJ to harmonize
EC law with national law. The German Constitutional Court
has been the ECJ's most active interlocutor in this regard. It
announced in the early 1970s that it would not accept the ultimate authority of the ECJ in cases involving the human rights
of German citizens because the ECJ had not established a comparable system of human rights protections in EC law. When
the ECJ did establish silch a system in response to the German
court, blending a mixture of national and international human
rights guarantees, the German court in turn softened its stance. 6

33. Id. at 642.
34. Id. at 643.
35. HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN CoURT OF JusTICE 254 (1986).
36. See Judgment of May 29, 1974, (Internazionale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v.
Einfuhr-undVorratsstelle fir Getreide und Futtermittel), Bundesverfassungsgericht
[Federal Constitutional Court], 37 BVerfGE 271, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Solange I]; Judgment of October 22, 1986, (Re the Application of Wflnsche
Handelsqesellschaft), Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], 73
BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Solange 11]. In Solknge I,
the German constitutional court concluded that EC law, which did not protect fundamental rights to a degree constitutionally required by the Federal Republic, would
not be accorded priority over German law designed to protect those rights. In Solange
II the German court concluded that the preceding 14 years of ECJ practice had created a climate of effective protection of fundamental rights within Community law.
Accordingly, the German court declined to further police the compatibility of EC law
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This pattern was repeated in the German Constitutional
Court's recent decision in Brunner v. The European Union Treaty, 7 a case challenging the constitutionality of the Maastricht
Treaty establishing the European Union. The German court
found the treaty constitutional, but only so long as the
competences of the European Union remained sufficiently limited to assure German citizens of the guarantees of democracy
provided them in their constitution.3 8 To keep the institutions
of the Union within these limits, the German court proposed
that it enter into a "relationship of co-operation" with the European Court of Justice, by which the German court would establish a threshold of constitutional guarantees and the ECJ would
adjudicate the application of these and additional guarantees on
a case-by-case basis. 9 As its opening contribution to this new
relationship, the German court further warned the ECJ to be
more circumspect in interpreting the competences of the European Union in the future, noting that overly expansive interpretations "would not produce any binding effects for Germany."'
The system proposed by the German Constitutional Court-a
partnership in which two courts with different but overlapping
spheres of jurisdiction interpret the same texts and monitor
each other's interpretations-may well prove unworkable when
generalized to all courts, even if only the supreme courts, of the
member states of the European Union. The current dialogue
will thus continue, with the ECJ responding to the German
Constitutional Court's challenge. For present purposes, the

with German fundamental rights. For an account of this trajectory, see J.A. Frowein,
Recent Case, 25 COMMON MET. L. REV. 201, 205 (1988); Weiler, supra note 8, at
2428.
37. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, (Brunner v. The European Union Treaty),
Bundesverfassungsgericht (2. Senat) [Federal Constitutional Court, 2d Chamber],
[1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (F.R.G.).
38. Id. at 76-78.
39. Id. at 79.
40. Id. at 105
[Iln [the] future it will have to be noted as regards interpretation of
enabling provisions by Community institutions and agencies that the
Union Treaty as a matter of principle distinguishes between the exercise
of a sovereign power conferred for limited purposes and the amending of
the Treaty, so that its interpretation may not have effects that are equivalent to an extension of the Treaty. Such an interpretation of enabling
rules would not produce any binding effects for Germany.
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point is not the feasibility of the particular architecture proposed, but the mode of proposal. It reflects a highly developed
form of vertical transjudicial communication.
Other examples of vertical communication are far less structured, and indeed far less interactive. First is the citation of
ECHR decisions by a handful of national courts of states party
to the European Convention on Human Rights.4' Although
judgments of the ECHR are formally binding on these states, it
is noteworthy that these courts have referred to ECHR decisions on their own motion, without pressure from the executive
or legislative branches of government. Such citations can be
read as the beginning of a direct court-to-court communication.
Second is the citation of ECHR decisions by national courts
that are not within the European system.42 These courts have
no formal allegiance to the supranational authority in question,
but nevertheless invoke its judgments. This form of vertical
communication may thus ultimately resemble the horizontal
communication discussed above. It is also possible, however,
that the supranational status of the tribunal cited lends it
additional authority.
C. Mixed Vertical-Horizontal Communication
The vertical and horizontal forms of transjudicial communication described above can also combine in several different ways.
First, supranational tribunals can serve as a conduit for horizontal communication. Among states party to the European
Convention on Human Rights, for instance, national legal rules
and principles are spreading through the medium of ECHR
decisions. According to Polakiewicz and Jacob-Foltzer:
domestic courts have gradually abandoned their reserved
attitude with regard to the Convention. We are witnessing
the beginning of a true dialogue between the European
Human Rights Court and national jurisdictions whereby

41. See MERRILIS, supra note 21 at 20. For a general survey of the impact of the
Convention within Europe, see THE EUROPEAN COURT FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUtmA RIGHTS 101-278 (M. Delmas-Marty, ed. 1992).
42. See, e.g., the Zimbabwean high court's citations to the ECHR cited supra
notes 4-5.
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principles like the proportionality test that have been developed in certain national legal orders are taken up by the
European Court of Human Rights and later accepted in
other countries as part of a common European standard."
A second variant of mixed communication assumes the presence of common legal principles in national legal orders that
can be distilled and disseminated by a supranational tribunal.
Rein Myullerson, a member of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, observes that, through the system of individual communications to the Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "the universal experience of mankind may enter national practice."" In
this conception, the supranational tribunal acts less as a conduit of diverse national experience than as a distiller of a limited set of universal principles which can then be communicated
to national courts through the medium of a vertical complaint
procedure.

II. DEGREE OF RECIPROCAL ENGAGEMENT
A second way of distinguishing between different types of
transjudicial communication is according to the degree of reciprocal engagement manifested by the courts involved. The examples discussed above neatly illustrate the potential range of
such involvement; the discussion here will thus be relatively
brief.
A. Direct Dialogue
The interaction between the ECJ and the national courts of
the member states of the European Union ("EU") represents a
genuine "dialogue," communication between two courts that is
effectively initiated by one and responded to by the other. In
some sense, the national courts in the EU system initiate the

43. Polakiewicz & Jacob-Foltzer, supra note 10, (pt. 1), 12 HLmi. RTS. L.J. 65, 66
(1991).
44. Rein A. Myullerson, Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights
Standards: Experience of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 1991-92 CAN.
HUM. RTs. Y.B. 105, 118.

1994]

TRANSJUDICIAL COMMUNICATION

113

dialogue by referring a case under Article 177, or by addressing
their decisions directly to the ECJ.45 On the other hand, most
of the judges on the ECJ would regard themselves as having
opened a conversation by encouraging Article 177 references.
The key distinguishing feature between this type of dialogue
and other forms of judicial communication is the awareness on
the part of both participants of whom they are talking to and a
corresponding willingness to take account of the response.
B. Monologue
The examples of horizontal communication discussed above
are more readily conceptualized as monologue than dialogue, in
the sense that a court whose ideas or conclusions are borrowed
by foreign courts, whether on the national or supranational
level, is not a self-conscious participant in an ongoing conversation. The originating court may indeed have little idea that its
views have a foreign audience. It speaks to the litigants in the
case before it, and perhaps also to the courts and the political
branches in a particular national legal system. Its ability to
communicate to foreign listeners depends on the initiative of
the listeners themselves.
C. IntermediatedDialogue
The example discussed above of dialogue among national
courts of states party to the European Convention on Human
Rights is an instance of "intermediated dialogue," in which the
ECHR effectively brokers communication among national courts.
On the one hand, this dialogue is closer to a monologue, in the
sense that the originating national court does not have control
over the dissemination of its ideas. On the other hand, the
ECHR is self-consciously undertaking this dissemination, with a
specific audience of national courts, and governments, in mind.
A similar phenomenon may emerge in the EU legal system, as
the national courts of some member states begin to realize that
ECJ syntheses of the national law and legal traditions of mem45. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 177, 1992 O.J. (C
224) 1, (signed at Maastricht), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter Treaty of

Maastricht].
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ber states rely more heavily on the experience of some member
states than others. British courts, for instance, may begin to
conclude that the human rights jurisprudence developed by the
ECJ draws more heavily on the human rights guarantees in the
German constitution than the British constitution.4" To the
extent that national courts respond by challenging the ECJ to
take account of their own national traditions, and the ECJ
refines its synthesis for reception by other national courts in
the European Union, the result will also be an intermediated
dialogue.

III. FUNCTIONS
Yet a third mode of typologizing transjudicial communication
is according to the various functions such communication performs. Some of these functions can be easily discerned from the
form of communication itself; others require an investigation of
the context in which the communication takes place.
A. Enhancing the Effectiveness of SupranationalTribunals
International law has long recognized the value, and often
the necessity, of domestic enforcement, either through domestic
implementing legislation or through direct enforcement of international obligations by domestic courts.47 Supranational tribunals such as the ECJ and the ECHR thus have an incentive to
woo national courts. Consider in this regard the following reflections from Judge Mancini of the ECJ. Commenting on the
surprising acceptance of ECJ judgments by courts of the member states of the European Union, he notes:
Why did this happen? The only reason I can see ... is the
cleverness of my predecessors. If what makes a judge "good"
is his awareness of the constraints on judicial decision-making and the knowledge that rulings must be convincing in
order to evoke obedience, the Luxembourg judges of the

46. I am indebted for this insight to Tom de la Mare, a participant in a conference on the Reception of European Community Law by National Courts at the Robert
Schuman Centre of the European University Institute, Florence, June 1994.
47. See Derrick Wyatt, New Legal Order, or Old?, 7 EuR. L. REV. 147 (1982).
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1960s and 1970s were obviously very good.... [Tihey developed a style that may be drab and repetitive, but explains as well as declares the law and they showed unlimited patience vis-&-vis the national judges, reformulating the
questions couched in imprecise terms or extracting from the
documents concerning the main proceedings the elements of
Community law which needed to be interpreted with regard
to the subject matter of the dispute.
It was by following this courteously didactic method that
the Luxembourg judges won the confidence of their colleagues from Palermo to Edinburgh and from Bordeaux to
Berlin; and it was by winning their confidence that they
were able to transform the procedure of Article 177 whereby
private individuals may challenge their national legislation
for incompatibility with Community law.48
In the discussion in Part I, I suggested other ways in which
the ECJ courted the national courts, by appealing to their traditional role of protecting individual rights and by overtly deferring to their authority within their defined sphere of jurisdiction. Joseph Weiler has also speculated on the role of 'judicial
empowerment," suggesting that lower national courts found that
they could enhance their power with regard to higher national
courts by operating in tandem with the ECJ.49 The Economist
has noted a similar phenomenon with respect to the ECHR,
noting that lower courts in Britain are increasingly likely to
cite decisions handed down by the ECHR, though the Convention, or indeed any written bill of rights, has not been enacted
into British law by parliament. 0
Regardless of the specific motives of the national courts involved, the point remains that supranational tribunals can use
transjudicial communication to bolster their effectiveness by
convincing national courts to follow their lead. Indeed, Mancini
suggests that dialogue with the national courts is one of the
few tools that supranational tribunals have at their disposal.5 1

48. Mancini, supra note 8, at 605-06.
49. Weiler, supra note 8, at 2426.
50. Human Rights: Unconventional, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 1994, at 56 ("British
judges are starting to act as if the convention had already been incorporated into
British law."). The Economist observes that this has also allowed lower courts to
enhance their power with regard to the national legislature. Id.
51. Mancini, supra 8, at 597.
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The resulting communication may be a form of didacticism or a
more strategic effort to sound notes that will resonate with a
particular audience. It is nonetheless a conversation between
courts with the aim of strengthening the authority of the supranational court.
B. Assuring and PromotingAcceptance of Reciprocal
International Obligations
Enhancement of the effectiveness of a supranational tribunal
will strengthen the international regime that the tribunal is
charged with enforcing. Horizontal judicial communication can
play a further role in promoting the acceptance and effectiveness of international obligations. In a situation in which a number of states are contemplating acceptance of a particular international legal obligation, references to the activity of fellow
courts in other states can act as both a security blanket and a
stick. On the one hand, by pointing to the actions of fellow
states, a national court can reassure itself (and its government)
that it will not disadvantage the nation in dealing with other
nations. On the other hand, an advocate arguing before such a
court can urge the government to get in line with fellow governments, suggesting the possibility of exclusion if a government remains a hold-out.
Joseph Weiler has identified these phenomena in the context
of acceptance of European Community law by national supreme
courts. He notes:
One reason why national courts, especially higher courts
but also lower courts, might have been tempted to resist
the [acceptance of Community law] could perhaps be in the
fear that they would be disadvantaging their national system and their governments in their dealings with other
member states. Accepting Community discipline does, after
all, restrict national autonomy.... Thus, when national
courts are satisfied that they are part of a trend, their own
acceptance is facilitated. Additionally, holding out against
accepting a new doctrine when other similar positioned
courts have committed themselves might be seen to compro-
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mise the professional pride and prestige of the recalcitrant
court.5 2

He surveys a number of decisions of European constitutional
courts accepting Community law, concluding that "transnational
reciprocity is employed as a device of both persuasion and justification."5 3
This function of horizontal judicial communication has a dual
character: it can function equally to weaken or at least to hinder enforcement of international obligations where evidence of
reciprocal acceptance of such obligations is lacking. Weiler's
observations can thus be contrasted with Eyal Benvenisti's
survey of reasons for the reluctance of national courts to enforce customary international law. Where national courts cannot
find evidence of reciprocal acceptance of international obligations on the part of their foreign counterparts, they hesitate to
place a unilateral burden on their own governments.'
C. Cross-Fertilization
The first two functions discussed above concern the role of
transjudicial communication in strengthening international
regimes, such as human rights treaties, and the tribunals established to monitor and enforce them. A more general function,
one that may accompany all the other functions identified or
may serve as an end in itself, is more general and harder to
direct or control. It is the simple dissemination of ideas from
one national legal system to another, from one regional legal
system to another, or from the international legal system or a
particular regional legal system to national legal systems. The
purpose or effect of such cross-fertilization may be to provide
inspiration for the solution of a particular legal problem, such
as the appropriate balance between individual freedom of expression and the needs of the community. 55 Alternatively, and
more broadly, cross-fertilization may foster the development of

52. Weiler, supra note 9, at 521-22.
53. Id. at 522.
54. Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International
Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR.J. INT'L L. 159 (1993).
55. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 158-59.
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fledgling national legal systems through the reception of entire
bodies of foreign law.56
The dissemination of particular ideas in a form useful to
judges is a form of transjudicial communication that requires
little direction or targeting. As the metaphor of cross-fertilization suggests, the court that is the source of the legal rules or
principles in question casts them into the transnational winds
without any particular knowledge of, or concern for, where they
will land. Switching metaphors, to the extent that the disseminating court can be understood as conducting a monologue, as
discussed above, it is up to the listeners to determine which
parts of that monologue they choose to take away, build upon,
and communicate to someone else. Neither the speaking nor the
listening court is bound by a treaty structure or any other
direct and formal links. I will argue below, however, that
informal links and common constraints nevertheless bind courts
participating in this form of communication into a loose
community.
Pure cross-fertilization through transjudicial communication
is likely to be very difficult to track. If the listening court genuinely seeks only ideas or inspiration from a foreign court, it has
no incentive to credit the source of those ideas in its opinion.
On the contrary, personal and national pride would seem to
give a judge every incentive to adopt a line of reasoning as her
own. Considerable anecdotal evidence, gleaned from confidential
interviews with law clerks of foreign courts and from careful
reading between the lines,57 demonstrates that courts draw on
the opinions of foreign courts without attribution.
It follows that evidence of foreign intellectual influences,
through direct citation or comparison to a foreign decision, is
likely to reflect something more than simple cross-fertilization.
In such cases evidence that a foreign court has reached the
same conclusion apparently has independent value, leading the
listening court not only to borrow the idea, but to publicize its
source. Indeed, the listening court may reach the same legal

56. See Glenn, supra note 6. Note that this phenomenon extends beyond
transiudicial communication per se, potentially extending to the borrowing of entire
areas of statutory law.
57. See cases cited supra note 23.
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conclusion or formulate the same line of reasoning independently, yet nevertheless search for and cite evidence that foreign
courts are like-minded.
D. Enhancing the Persuasiveness,Authority, or Legitimacy of
Individual Judicial Decisions
Whether or not the listening court has in fact borrowed an
idea or a legal solution from a foreign decision, citation of such
a decision seems most likely to reflect a calculation by the
listening court that evidence of foreign support or parallel reasoning will strengthen its own decision. Absent a defined judicial hierarchy, such a calculation can have several meanings.
First, for courts adhering to what American lawyers would
define as a highly formalist view of the law-a view that the
law is discovered rather than made-evidence that courts
around the world have reached similar conclusions to a similar
legal problem would constitute per se evidence that the decision
in question was a correct statement of "the law." Second, for
courts with a more realist view of the law-understanding the
law's potential indeterminacy yet nevertheless committed to the
need to persuade as well as to coerce their audience of litigants, lawyers, and citizens in any particular case-the persuasiveness of any one particular decision may be enhanced by a
simple demonstration that others have trodden a similar path.
Third, historical and cultural traditions may endow the decisions of particular foreign courts with particular authority or
legitimacy. Decisions of the courts of a former colonial power
may enjoy this status after the colonial relationship has ended,
as in the case of the authority of English decisions in the young
U.S. legal system.
E. Collective Deliberation
A fifth function of transjudicial communication is the fostering of a process of collective judicial deliberation on a set of
common problems. The examples in Part I reflect both specific
and general forms of collective deliberation.
The specific phenomenon results from the explicit relationship of judicial cooperation called for by the German Constitu-
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tional Court with regard to the ECJ. The German court invites
common deliberation over the question of the competences of
the European Union, as delineated by the Treaty of Maastricht.
The court further proposes a division of labor whereby the
German court will set forth absolute limits flowing from the
German constitution and the ECJ will determine specific
competences within the remaining realm. At the same time,
however, the German court reserves the right to review the
ECJ's determination of competences under the Maastricht Treaty, with the corresponding possibility that it will effectively
overrule ECJ decisions that, in its judgment, do not conform
with the provisions of the Treaty. The ECJ, for its part, is free
to consider the provisions of the German constitution and the
constitutions of other members of the European Union when
interpreting the Treaty.
Should the ECJ accept the German court's invitation, the
relationship established would represent a further step in the
process of collective deliberation between the German Constitutional Court and the ECJ over the EC law of human rights.5 8
As discussed above, the German Constitutional Court, as required by the German constitution, had previously reserved the
right to determine minimum human rights safeguards for Community legislation. The ECJ responded by fashioning a Community law of human rights that incorporated the constitutional
traditions of all the EC member states. The result was a joint
sharing of jurisdiction, and hence deliberation, over the interpretation of both national constitutions and community law.
This ongoing process of transjudicial communication eased jurisdictional conflicts between national courts and a supranational
tribunal by substituting an image of judicial collaboration in
pursuit of the same substantive goals.
A less developed example of a specific form of collective judicial deliberation through transjudicial communication is emerging among the states party to the European Convention on
Human Rights. As the European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR") surveys the common constitutional provisions and
practices of the states under its jurisdiction and disseminates
national norms from one country to another through the medi-

58. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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um of national courts, it is effectively collaborating with these
national courts on the development of a common European law
of human rights.59 Assume, for instance, that the ECHR emphasizes the German principle of proportionality as an important element of the protection of human rights under the European Convention, and that a British court then accepts and
applies this principle in the process of interpreting the Convention as part of British law. Its interpretation is likely to be
conditioned by British understandings of due process of law.
When the ECHR next surveys the national practice of states
party to the Convention, it will have to take account of this
British variant on the German principle, and alter its formulation of the European principle accordingly. The ultimate result
is likely to resemble the product of collective deliberation by
judges from different national legal traditions, resembling the
actual decision-making processes of the ECJ.6"
The more general example of collective judicial deliberation is
more fragile and speculative. It is also thus far limited to the
human rights domain. The growing willingness of national and
regional courts to follow the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights-such as the citation of ECHR decisions by Zimbabwean courts and by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights-suggests recognition of a global set

59. Laurence R. Heifer notes that the ECHR and the Commission "weigh deference to national decision-makers against their conviction that the treaty must be interpreted in light of progressive European conditions and attitudes." Laurence R.
Heifer, Consensus, Coherence, and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26
CORNELL INTL L.J. 133, 135 (1993). The human rights tribunals therefore defer to
states on the margin of compatibility with the Convention, but may find violations
when they discern a broadly defined "consensus" among the contracting states that
expand the scope of a right beyond the level espoused by the defendant state. Id. at
137-38. To find this consensus, the tribunals look in part to the legal institutions of
the member states. Id. at 139.
Mark Janis has urged for the formalization of a similar kind of collaboration
among the European regional courts. He has called for a "cooperative mechanism"
and the referral of cases between the ECJ and the ECHR. Mark Janis, Human
Rights Protection in Europe, in Contemporary InternationalLaw Issues: Opportunities
at a Time of Momentous Change, 1994 PRO. ASIELNVIR JOINT CONF. 22, 29-32.

60. For a description of the wide variations in legal approaches among lawyers
and judges in the European Union, see Francis G. Jacobs, PreparingEnglish Lawyers
for Europe, 17 EUR. L. REv. 232 (1992). Ulrich Everling suggests that "each Judge
has the important function of introducing the legal thinking and basic concepts of the
Member State to which he belongs into the Court's consideration." Everling, supra
note 8 at 1296.
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of human rights issues to be resolved by courts around the
world in colloquy with one another. Such recognition flows from
the ideology of universal human rights embedded in the U.N.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1 The premise of universalism, however, does not anoint any one tribunal with universal authority to interpret and apply these rights. Collective
judicial deliberation, through awareness, acknowledgment, and
use of decisions rendered by fellow human rights tribunals,
frames a universal process of judicial deliberation and decision.
IV.

COMMON PRECONDITIONS FOR TRANSJUDICIAL
COMMUNICATION

Parts I-III establish a typology of transjudicial communication. All the examples listed are forms of communication among
courts across borders. Yet do they all actually relate to one
another sufficiently to be classified as aspects of a common
phenomenon? Do they share common elements or attributes
that serve to make the generation of such a typology useful as
more than an exercise in classification? More concretely, is the
dialogue between the ECJ and the national courts structured by
Article 177 part of the same general phenomenon as the crossfertilization of ideas among national constitutional courts?
I argue that common elements can be identified, and that
their identification offers a different and valuable perspective
on transjudicial communication. This section will identify three
such attributes, related but distinct. First is a conception of
judicial identity that emphasizes judicial autonomy, a self-understanding whereby courts engaged in transjudicial communication conceive of themselves and their foreign counterparts as
courts independent of their fellow governmental institutions,
even in the unfamiliar and traditionally trencherous world of
international relations. Second is a reliance on persuasive
rather than coercive authority. Third is an implicit conception
of a common judicial enterprise among courts in a particular
region or even world-wide, a mutual recognition of one another
as similarly situated institutions performing similar functions
under broadly similar rules.
61. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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A. Courts as Autonomous InternationalActors
Courts typically disappear behind the facade of the unitary
state in international relations. Domestically, they are the servants of, but also the checks on, the national legislature and
executive. Internationally, they are inclined to present a united
front, deferring to the executive in any case with significant
foreign policy implications.6 2
Courts engaged in transjudicial communication, however,
conceive of themselves as autonomous actors forging an autonomous relationship with their foreign or supranational counterparts. The relationship between the German Constitutional
Court and the ECJ again offers the most striking example: two
courts interacting largely independently of either the German
government or the European Community's Council of Ministers.
Other examples include the willingness of lower national courts
within the European Union to engage in independent dialogue
with the European Court of Justice, frequently against the will
of higher national courts and of the national executive.' Finally, the search for foreign inspiration or support by national
courts confronting specific cases is a search by courts willing to
look beyond the boundaries of their national legal systems and
beyond the constraints of their relationship with other branches
of their national governments, to their counterparts abroad. The
image of collective judicial deliberation outlined above is one
that emerges quite apart from the rough and tumble of international politics.
This autonomous self-conception does not necessarily entail a
commitment to internationalism or universal interests, however.
As discussed above, it is quite possible for national courts to
engage in dialogue with one another to protect what they perceive as their government's interests. But it does require that
62. See Benvenisti, supra note 54, for a discussion of the deferential postures
taken by British, French, and American courts in foreign affairs. For a discussion of
the position taken by French courts, see ELIZABETH ZOLLER, DROIT DES RELATIONS
EXTRiEURES [THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS] (1992); by German courts, see Thomas M. Franck, POLITICAL QUESTIONS JuDIcIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992); by U.S. courts, see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
63. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 8 at 2426.
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courts have a conception of themselves as actors capable of
determining those interests on their own account, even if they
then choose to consider the views of other government departments.
B. Persuasive Authority
All the functions listed above, from enhancement of the effectiveness of supranational tribunals and international regimes to
intellectual cross-fertilization, assume a judicial interaction
based on persuasive rather than coercive authority. Patrick
Glenn describes persuasive authority as "authority which attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it."' As every domestic
lawyor knows, persuasive authority remains very important in
national legal systems, notwithstanding the existence of a formal hierarchy and instruments of state power at the disposal of
the courts. Judges would not otherwise feel compelled to offer
reasons for their decisions." Nevertheless, as long as the over64. Glenn, supra note 6, at 263. Glenn's understanding of persuasive authority
encompasses the entire phenomenon of the reception of foreign law by a national
legal system, such as the Canadian embrace of British common law or the German
reception of Roman law. See id. at 269-73, 274-76. Law is accepted not by virtue of
political obligation, as the words spoken by the voice of the people, or the monarch,
or God, but rather because it satisfies particular political and cultural needs at a particular historical moment. See id. at 273-74.
65. A typical example of persuasive authority within a national legal system arises in the instance of a case of first impression that generates several different resolutions to a particular legal problem. Over time, subsequent courts adopt the reasoning
that they find most persuasive, which then becomes established caselaw. See, for
example, the extension of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA") to
cover suits against individual governmental officials. Several early decisions concluded,
based on a reading of the text and legislative history of the FSIA, that the term
"agencies or instrumentalities" of a foreign state could not be read to cover individuals. Other courts, however, disagreed, reasoning that in many cases a suit against an
individual governmental official was in fact a suit against the state. In Chuidian v.
Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit reviewed
these conflicting lines of decision and sided with those courts that had extended the
act. This view has subsequently been followed without exception. See Trajano v.
Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 497 n.8 (9th Cir. 1992), affd 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994)
(stating that an individual acting in his personal capacity and beyond his official
capacity is liable, but not otherwise); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); U.S. v. Hendron, 813 F. Supp. 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). See also Intercontinental Dictionary Series v. De Gruyter, 822 F. Supp 662 (C.D.Cal. 1993) (according individual state-run university employees the same immunity as the institution
itself). Here, then, is an example of persuasive authority within a national judicial
system. It lacks the other attributes, however, of judicial dialogue.
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all legitimacy of a national legal system remains intact, any
particular judicial decision will be followed, even if it is manifestly unpersuasive, due to the actual or potential coercive authority of the judge.6 6
That authority is not available transnationally. Even where a
body of supranational law is formally binding, the ECJ or the
ECHR has no coercive power to compel adherence. They must
instead rely on persuasion. Similarly, courts described above as
"listening courts" in a process of cross-fertilization are likely to
take up a particular idea only if they are persuaded or if they
conclude that either the content of the idea and/or its source
will enable them better to persuade their own audience.
In this regard, consider again Judge Mancini's reflections on
the mechanisms used by the ECJ to enhance its effectiveness.
"Knowing that the Court had almost no powers that were not
traceable to its institutional standing and the persuasiveness of
its judgments," he writes, the ECJ judges "made the most of
these assets."" The ECJ had no authority beyond the power of
its written text and the force of the arguments used to illuminate it. Yet national courts ultimately used its judgments to
defy and circumvent higher national courts, and to bind their
own governments.
C. A Common JudicialIdentity and Methodology
Communication requires a modicum of common ground. At a
minimum, courts must perceive their interlocutors as courts, as
institutions engaged in the application and interpretation of the
law. Further, there must be tokens of recognition by which
courts can recognize each other as courts and can ensure that
they are operating on a similar conception of what it means to
be a court. For the courts of liberal democracies, the evidence
required will be evidence of commitment to, and understanding
of, the rule of law. At a minimum, such courts must perceive
that their interlocutors conceive of themselves as servants of

66. Of course, civil law decisions technically do not bind other judges. Nonetheless, "as a practical matter it is generally recognized in civil law systems that judges
do and should take heed of prior decisions." MARY A. GLENDON, ET AL., COMPARATIVE
LEGAL TRADITIONS 208 (1994). Common law decisions do bind future judges to decide
similar cases the same way, under the doctrine of stare decisis.

67. Mancini, supra note 8,at 605-06.
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the law-of rules and standards neutrally and uniformly applied-rather than as the direct instruments or agents of political masters.68 More generally, evidence of common methods of
legal reasoning will be important: the solemnity of stare decisis,
even in legal systems in which judicial precedent is not formally binding; the importance, indeed centrality, of texts, at least
where texts exist; the ability to formulate a rule of general
applicability and to generate coherent distinctions between the
outcome in the case at hand and divergent outcomes in apparently similar cases; and logical clarity and consistency across
time. 9
All of the examples of transjudicial communication given
above have assumptions of commonality embedded in them. In
the European Community context, Mancini's account relies on
an underlying assumption of a common metric of "good" legal
reasoning: an assumption that all national courts would respond to the same qualities in the ECJ's decisions.7" The passage cited from the Van Gend & Loos case also reveals that the
ECJ assumed that all national courts within the Community
conceived of their primary function as protecting individual
rights. Similar assumptions underpin the intermediated dialogue among European national courts brokered by the European Court of Human Rights.71 And in cases of horizontal communication in which a national court seeks to assess the degree
of acceptance of mutual international obligations by canvassing
the decisions of foreign courts, it is assuming that the executive
and legislative branches of the foreign state in question are
bound by the decisions of their courts to the same extent as it
expects its decision to bind its own executive and legislative
branches.
The phenomenon of judicial cross-fertilization per se, on the
other hand, does not require a prior level of mutual recognition.
68. Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and
the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1916-22 (1992).
69. These commonalities can transcend apparent differences of deductive and analogical reasoning apparently embedded in common and civil law systems. As Cass
Sunstein argues, both methods contain elements of the other, and indeed can together
contribute to balanced legal decision-making. Cass Sunstein, POLITICAL CONFLICT AND
LEGAL AGREEMENT, 1966 PANNER LECTURES IN HUMAN VALUES.
70. Mancini, supra note 8, at 597.
71. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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The pure exchange of ideas can occur across radically different
contexts; a U.S. court could conceivably borrow a particular
legal formulation or conclusion from a court of the former Soviet Union, even if the two courts in question conceived of themselves, their function, and the law itself very differently. Actual
citation of a foreign court as persuasive authority, however,
assumes that the audience for a particular decision will recognize the foreign court as sufficiently like the national court, or
at least sufficiently embodying the aspirations of the national
legal system, to give weight to its words.
How is such mutual recognition among courts fostered and
encouraged? In the European Community context, Joseph
Weiler offers the following explanation:
The constitutional interpretations given to the Treaty of
Rome by the ECJ carried a legitimacy deriving from two
sources. First was from the composition of the ECJ, which
had as members senior jurists from all member states. The
second was from the legal language itself: the language of
reasoned interpretation, logical deduction, systemic and
temporal coherence-the artifacts that national courts would

partly rely on to enlist obedience within their own national
orders.72
This explanation recapitulates the two factors identified above.

The easiest way to foster a common judicial identity is to appoint judges to a supranational tribunal from the national judiciary; the second is to ensure the use of a common language."
A third factor, however, is awareness of a common enterprise,
even if only in the sense of confrontation of common issues or
problems. Courts must be able to transpose each other's decisions to their own circumstances to be able to use them. Recognition of this commonality does not obviate cultural differences,
but it assumes the possibility that generic legal problems such
as the balancing of rights and duties, individual and community
interests, and the protection of individual expectations, may
transcend those differences.

72. Weiler, supra note 8, at 521.

73. Id.
74. See id. at 520-21.
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In the European Community, the ECJ succeeded in defining
and promoting the enterprise of building a European legal
system as part of the larger project of giving content and effect
to the Treaty of Rome and building an "ever closer union of the
Peoples of Europe."75 Beyond the European Community, however, awareness of a common enterprise can flow either from a
particular self-conception or a common substantive focus.
Constitutional courts, for instance, may see their foreign counterparts as collaborators in a larger project of promoting
constitutionalism-the commitment to a legal code of political,
economic, and social conduct embodied in a written text or
embedded in national practice. Additionally, the courts of some
subset of countries may see their primary function as the protection of individual rights against the government. From this
perspective, it is not surprising that one of the most active
areas of transjudicial communication outside the European
Community is among courts specifically charged with the interpretation and application of international instruments concerning human rights.
By no means does an awareness of a common enterprise
entail identical outcomes in different national legal systems. On
the contrary, the same rule of law principles that may empower
courts to conceive of themselves as autonomous and to identify
with foreign courts governed by the same principles may also
impose powerful national and cultural constraints. The U.S. Supreme Court must expound "a Constitution for the United
States of America," not for Britain or Zimbabwe. 6 So too must
the British and the Zimbabwean courts follow both the text and
subtext of their national laws. However, as Glendon, Lester,
and Henkin persuasively argue with respect to the U.S. Supreme Court, the task of interpreting and applying national
laws can be enriched and facilitated by taking foreign judicial
opinions on similar questions into account. I argue more generally that it is the awareness of the similarity or commonality
of the judicial enterprise across countries, an awareness bol-

75. See Preamble, Treaty of Rome, supra note 11.
76. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2716 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 145-170; Lester, supra note 3; HENKIN, supra
note 62, at 5; Henkin, supra note 15.
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stered in turn by a mutual recognition of a common judicial
identity and an openness to persuasive authority, that fosters a
willingness to look abroad.
V. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
Transjudicial communication is not a new phenomenon, but
anecdotal evidence suggests that it is increasing. To the extent
that the various examples of transjudicial communication are in
fact part of a discrete phenomenon unified by underlying characteristics and preconditions, it is tempting to speculate on both
its causes and potential implications."8 I use the word "cause"
deliberately loosely; factors such as mutual recognition of a
common judicial identity and a judicial self-conception as an autonomous actor free to interact with other national and supranational courts are causes of transjudicial communication in the
sense that they are preconditions for it. In this concluding section I seek to probe more generally, to investigate larger social,
economic, and political trends both within nations and in the
international community that might have a bearing on
transjudicial communication. In the spirit of such speculation, I
will close with a brief discussion of the potential consequences
of increased transjudicial communication as a permanent
phenomenon.
A. Causes
The most obvious cause of increased transjudicial communication is the increased internationalization of all domestic transactions due to historical and technological trends. As the subjects of domestic adjudication take on an increased international
dimension, courts will be forced into contact with other legal
systems and hence other courts. Alternatively, to the extent
that internationalization of these various substantive areas of

78. Some of the causes listed below would apply equally to the simple citation or
use of foreign or international law as to transjudicial communication between the
tribunals charged with interpreting and applying that law. I suggest that the second
is a subset of the first. If a "listening" or "receiving" court does not acknowledge the
validity of the law that the "speaking" court is interpreting and applying,
transjudicial communication would be pointless.
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the law is driven by still deeper technological factors, those
factors may bear equally on courts. Access to global legal data
bases, for instance, would certainly facilitate awareness of foreign law.79
The internationalization of subject areas such as human
rights leads to a second cause of increased transjudicial communication: the growing number of supranational tribunals that
can communicate with domestic courts and other supranational
tribunals. Justice M.D. Kirby, President of the New South
Wales Court of Appeal in Australia, argues that the development of caselaw by supranational tribunals interpreting international human rights treaties "make[s] it likely that judges
and lawyers of the future in every land will pay increasing
attention to the backdrop of international legal norms.""° What
is striking about this analysis is the implicit claim that it is
courts that make the difference; that the existence of international legal instruments alone will have relatively little impact
until they are interpreted and applied by courts.8 The point
here may be a very commonsensical one-national courts may
seek guidance on specific questions that the instrument itself
cannot answer. Conversely, supranational tribunals that are
actually adjudicating a fair number of cases under an international instrument are likely to have begun the hard work of
actually interpreting and applying general formulae.
A third cause encompasses a range of structural factors encouraging transjudicial communication. This category has several subcategories. First is the existence of international instruments that intentionally structure specific kinds of transjudicial
communication. The best example is Article 177 of the Treaty of
Rome. Even though the drafters of that treaty did not envision
the kind of judicial dialogue that ultimately resulted from the
combined efforts of the ECJ and the national courts, they did
79. See M.D. Kirby, The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by Reference to InternationalHuman Rights Norms, 62 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 514, 516 (1988) on
increasing awareness due to technological factors of events and ideas in other countries.
80. Id.
81. In explaining why British and Australian courts appear willing to look to
human rights treaties for guidance in constitutional and statutory construction, Kirby
notes: "The existence of a tribunal with an accepted jurisdiction may explain why
such law will be taken into account by the English courts in practice." Id. at 515.
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at least establish a structure providing for the referral of cases
originally appearing before a national court to a supranational
court. Second are the provisions for direct individual access to
supranational tribunals contained in the Optional Protocols to
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 2
These provisions do not require court-to-court communication,
but they ensure that the supranational tribunal in question is
likely to be reviewing the work of national courts, whether
directly or indirectly. Further, they guarantee a symmetry and
basic commonality between the national and supranational
entities by ensuring that they are performing the same function
for the same parties under the same integrated body of law. A
third structural factor is actually negative: the absence of national law on point. Kirby notes that in countries such as Australia without a "comprehensive constitutional statement of
human rights," judges and lawyers may find international instruments "useful starting points."" Similar arguments have
been made in the British context.
A fourth cause may emerge from a more general global trend:
the "third wave" of democratization resulting in a growing community of "liberal states."84 Virtually all the examples cited in
this article involve the courts of either established or aspiring
liberal democracies. Further, all the most intensive and interactive examples of transjudicial communication, such as the cases
of direct judicial dialogue, arise in the context of the world's
most established community of liberal states, the European
Union. The unifying factors of autonomous judicial identity,
persuasive authority, and mutual recognition as participants in
a common enterprise are all likely to be stronger among the
courts of liberal democracies, and between national courts in

82. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Eleventh
Protocol to the European Convention for the Protections of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms, Europ. T.S. No. 155. The protocol was signed by representatives of 31 of
the 32 parties to the European Convention. See generally Henry G. Schermers, The
European Court of Human Rights After the Merger, 18 EUR. L. REV. 493 (1993).
83. Kirby, supra note 79, at 516.
84. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and
Foreign Affairs, (pts. 1 & 2), 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 323 (1983).
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liberal democracies and supranational tribunals charged with
overseeing liberal democracies. 5 The spread of liberal democracy holds the promise of a widening community of liberal
states, emboldens courts to act as autonomous foreign policy
actors, and enhances awareness of a common effort to construct
and preserve the rule of law.
B. Consequences
Imagine a world of regular and interactive transjudicial communication-among national courts, between national courts
and supranational tribunals, and among supranational tribunals. It would be a world in which courts perceived themselves
independent of, although linked to, their fellow political institutions, open to persuasive authority, and engaged in a common
enterprise of interpreting and applying national and international law, protecting individual rights, and ensuring that power is corralled by law. National differences would be recognized
and often given priority, but would not obscure common problems nor block the adoption of foreign solutions. Courts would
relate to one another in ways that could circumvent and constrain other branches of national governments and that could
forge an independent link between national and international
institutions. In this conception, the phenomenon of transjudicial
communication is a pillar of a compelling vision of global legal
relations. It is a vision that is particularly potent in the human
rights field, but potentially extends to all fields.
Consider some of the potential implications of this vision.
First, the quality of judicial decision-making should improve
worldwide, on the simple Madisonian premise that collective
deliberation will produce a better solution than can be arrived
at by any one individual." As Glendon writes about the European Court of Human Rights, its composition "guarantees that

85. I suggest, in this regard, that courts in countries such as Australia, India,
and Zimbabwe, would be less likely to cite the judgments of a supranational tribunal
whose decisions bore the hallmark of brokered ideological conflict.
86. Glendon contends that "the current brisk international traffic in ideas about
rights" offers to judges potent analytical tools tested by other decision-makers and an
awareness of alternative approaches to legal problems-these are the standard benefits of the comparative method. See Glendon supra note 1, at 158.
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the collective wisdom of a wide variety of legal systems will be
brought to bear on any issue that comes before it.""7 Regular
and intensive transjudicial communication promises an equivalent amount of information, even if it cannot replicate collective
personal deliberation. Ongoing relationships between national
and supranational courts offer a form of collective deliberation
over time, as both sides work their way toward a mutually
satisfactory position on legal issues of common concern and
impact. Moreover, courts sharing insights with their counterparts from other nations will be forced to examine their own
legal systems in comparative perspective, a perspective that
often casts features we take for granted into sharp relief.
A second consequence of established and frequent
transjudicial communication is that courts engaged in such
communication could come to perceive themselves as members
of a transnational community of law. This community of law
would be co-extensive with, but distinct from, the corollary
community of states. It could emerge in two ways. On the one
hand, communication among courts. in a particular subset of
states could add a legal dimension to an existing cultural or
ideological community. The best example is Western Europe, a
group of states in which a combination of convergent cultural,
political, and economic factors have long led scholars to imagine
a "common law of Europe.""8 Even beyond Western Europe,
however, the interest in and acceptance of foreign judicial ideas,
or the willingness to engage with a supranational tribunal on a
court-to-court rather than a court-to-state basis, strongly suggests a prior convergence of deep-seated principles and values,
as well as modes of legal reasoning about those principles and
values. On the other hand, the creation or generation of a legal
community through transjudicial communication could itself
87. Id.
88. See,

e.g., NEW

PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON

LAW

OF EUROPE

(Mauro

Cappelletti, ed., 1978). Cappelletti contends that the need to overcome the tragedies
of the past century, combined with the risks of division in a world that demands
larger markets, has led to an explosion of transnational public law. Id. at 24. He
argues that this law can not only be identified in tribunals such as the ECJ and
ECHR, but also that "the rise and growth of constitutional adjudication (with or without the establishment of special constitutional courts) ....
is a feature which is making tache d'huile in modern constitutional systems." Id. He claims that these institutional and constitutional judicial commonalities have even reduced the differences
between civil and common law within Europe. Id.
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help define and strengthen common political and economic values in the states concerned. The court of a fledgling democracy,
for instance, might look to the opinions of courts in older and
more established democracies as a way of binding its country to
this existing community of states.
A third consequence of increased transjudicial communication
should be an increased blurring of the lines between national
and international law. National courts borrowing ideas from
supranational tribunals; supranational tribunals synthesizing
national law; national and supranational courts acknowledging
overlapping jurisdiction and sharing responsibility: a dualist
vision of watertight spheres of national and international law
cannot be sustained. This vision has always been more hypothetical than real; many international lawyers will argue that
such interpenetration is as old as the international legal system. As defined in the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, international law itself is composed, in part, of "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 9 Nevertheless, the direct interaction of courts across the traditionally
hypothesized boundaries between national and international
legal systems would create unprecedented opportunities for the
intermeshing of national and international law. Furthermore, to
the extent that such interaction requires and/or fosters an
awareness of a common enterprise, the very notion of a national versus an international legal system could begin to dissolve.
The fourth and final consequence of increased transjudicial
communication would be the spread and enhanced protection of
universal human rights. It should be evident from the many
examples given above that this phenomenon is particularly
pronounced among courts explicitly charged with the protection
of human rights, whether as embodied in international treaties
or national constitutions. Protection of individual rights comprises, the core of judicial identity for many courts; rights discourse, particularly in a more nuanced European mode,90 appears to be readily accessible to courts around the world; and

89. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(c), 1947 I.C.J. Acts &
Docs. 46.
90. The difference between a European-style discourse emphasizing rights as defined and constrained by complementary responsibilities and an American emphasis
on absolute rights is the subject of GLENDON, supra note 1, at 145-70.
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ideas about rights can be directly and efficiently communicated
through judicial opinions, even if they are translated and applied very differently by the receiving court. These are all factors suggesting that an increase in transjudicial communication
is likely to spell an increase in communication about human
rights protection.
In addition to these factors, a network of courts self-consciously communicating with one another around the world
would reflect a strengthening of separation of powers principles
on a global level. The principle of separation of powers protects
human rights by providing a fundamental curb on the abuse of
state power. To the extent that either a cause or a result of a
transnational network of courts communicating with one another and with supranational courts is courts' conception of themselves as autonomous actors even beyond state boundaries, as
opposed to integral and effectively invisible sub-components of
state actors in the international system, the possibility of checking more repressive elements of national governments is increased. Such courts might come to see themselves as part of a
judicial network of protection for individuals and groups in
domestic and transnational society. Members of this network
would rely on "the law" as interpreted and applied by the
courts of many states, even where it is temporarily disregarded
or distorted in the hands of a particular ruler holding sway
over a national legal system. The immediate impact on human
rights in such a system is likely to be minimal. But over time,
courts bolstered by communication with other national and
supranational courts will be bolstered in their efforts to make
their own voices heard.
VI. CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this article has been to develop a
typology of transjudicial communication. I have classified such
communication by form, degree of reciprocal engagement, and
function. The results define a spectrum running from self-consciously interactive dialogue between a national and a supranational court at one end, to a nationial court's unacknowledged
use of a foreign court's ideas or mode of reasoning at the other.
Having identified different phenomena that could be classified
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as transjudicial communication, I posed the question whether,
in fact, they could be said to form part of a larger phenomenon.
I suggest that they can, as they are unified by an underlying
set of common elements, assumptions, or preconditions.
Transjudicial communication, in all the forms described here,
presupposes that the courts involved conceive of themselves as
autonomous governmental actors even beyond national borders;
that they speak a sufficient common language to interact in
terms of persuasion rather than compulsion; and that they
understand themselves as similar entities engaged in a common
enterprise. The entire range of examples relied on exhibit these
preconditions to a greater or lesser degree. That these preconditions appear to exist among a growing number of national
courts and supranational tribunals throughout the world in
turn opens the door to a new vision of global legal relations.
The reinforcement of courts as autonomous international and
transnational actors is a step toward the disaggregation of state
sovereignty into component executive, legislative, and judicial
institutions that can interact independently across borders. The
fruits of such interaction could be envisioned as networks of
institutions, or of institutionalized relations, that would emulate
the form and substance of a world government without in fact
transcending or displacing nation-states. To take one example,
networks of national and supranational courts talking to one
another in a process of collective deliberation over the protection of human rights would, in effect, create a multi-dimensional mechanism for creating and enforcing the human rights
provisions of a hypothetical global constitution. But they would
do so with a minimum of global machinery. Even the supranational elements in this network would depend for their effectiveness on the responsiveness of national courts.
The political philosopher Michael Sandel called recently for
the creation of institutions that will institute and safeguard
democracy at a global level.9 Such calls are typically under-

91. Sandel observed that "[o]ne of the biggest challenges for democracy in our
time is to develop political institutions that will be powerful enough to deal with
global markets, but accountable enough to enable citizens to feel that they are still in
control." Thomas I. Friedman, When Money Talks, Governments Listen, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 1994 at D3. Those governments that refuse the challenge, Sandel chides, are
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stood as appeals to the framers of a global constitution, and to
the forgers of international institutions analogous to domestic
courts, legislatures, and executives. In fact, however, communication and interaction between existing national institutions is
likely to serve far better.2 Transjudicial communication, while
a seemingly small phenomenon in the face of such a grand
vision, is nevertheless an important instance of interaction
among judicial institutions around the world. Many of these
institutions are bound by multiple ties, both formal and informal, but ultimately by none so powerful as a common commitment to the rule of law. The meshing of that commitment,
through increasingly direct interaction, is more likely to establish an international rule of law than a single international
court. International government requires common formal institutions; international governance is more likely to require
communication and coordination among existing institutions.
Courts are a fine place to start.

"like the king who stood on the beach and tried to stop the tide." Id.
92. Such communication and interaction may nevertheless benefit from catalyzing
and coordinating functions generated by international institutions. These institutions
will have a very different function, however, from institutions charged with the substance of global regulation.

